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THE PAST AND FUTURE ROLE OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AND GUN CONTROL IN FIGHTS OVER
CONFIRMATION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
Allen Rostron*
America’s elected representatives do many things well, but
making firearms policies and assessing Supreme Court nominees are two
tasks with which they have struggled greatly in recent decades. Indeed,
it is tough to say which of the two areas – regulating guns or evaluating
potential justices – has become the greater source of disappointment and
discontent.
Gun control is one of the nation’s most volatile public policy
issues. Many contend that the country pays a heavy price every day as a
result of woefully inadequate legal controls on firearms. Others believe
that legal restrictions on guns are counterproductive and that the freedom
to have guns is in great peril. This gun control versus gun rights debate
“reached a painful stalemate long ago.”1 It has “become deeply enmeshed
in the culture wars between liberals and conservatives, between people
who live in cities and people who live in the country” and it is now “one
of the arenas in which we as Americans try to figure out who we are.”2
Gun laws remain “an often incoherent patchwork of provisions” with
“unjustifiable gaps,”3 and little hope remains for a more sensible approach
because gun issues have become a “premier lethal third rail in American
politics.”4 Whatever one believes to be the ideal regulatory approach,
*
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William R. Jacques Constitutional Law Scholar and Professor of Law, University
of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law. B.A. 1991, University of Virginia;
J.D. 1994, Yale Law School. Professor Rostron formerly worked as a senior
staff attorney for the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. The views
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Gary Younge, Made in America: Pride that Keeps Gun Law in Place: The Massacre
Grabbed Public Attention but Prompted Little Political Debate, Guardian
(London), Apr. 21, 2007, at 12.
Mark V. Tushnet, Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the
Battle over Guns, at xiv (2007).
Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun
Control, 67 Md. L. Rev. 511, 513 (2008).
Harry Rosenfeld, Killings Renew Gun Control Issue, Times Union (Albany,
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the government’s handling of the issue has frequently been a national
embarrassment.
Similarly, few people have good things to say about the process
by which the U.S. Senate decides whether to confirm those nominated
to become Supreme Court justices.5 Hypocrisy abounds, and intellectual
consistency is rare, as senators decry tactics and arguments used against a
nominee they favor, but then turn around and employ exactly the same
means of attack when they oppose a nominee’s confirmation.6 “Nobody
is interested in playing by a fair set of rules” and “still less do many people
seem to care how much right and left have come to resemble each other
in the gleeful and reckless distortions that characterize the efforts to
defeat challenged nominations.”7 In particular, observers condemn the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearings on Supreme Court nominations as
farcical charades marked by fatuous political grandstanding and “Mickey
Mouse maneuvers and insinuations, spiced here and there with outright
lies.”8 Meanwhile, nominees take “the judicial Fifth” and decline to
answer questions that would reveal their views about any controversial
legal issues.9 The hearings degenerate into “dreary rituals,”10 a sort of
N.Y.), Apr. 22, 2007, at E5.
See David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491, 1491 (1992). The literature on the
flaws of the confirmation process is voluminous. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter,
The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments
Process (1995); Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme
Court nomination Process (2006); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Next
Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process (2009);
Charles Pickering, Supreme Chaos: The Politics of Judicial
Confirmation & the Culture War (2006); Benjamin Wittes,
Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times
(2009).
6
Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 513, 517-18 (2003).
7
Carter, supra note 5, at ix.
8
Thomas Sowell, Hypocrisy and Grandstanding at the Senate Condemnation
Hearings, Balt. Sun, Jan. 19, 2006, at 15A.
9
David E. Rosenbaum, No-Comment Is Common at Hearings for Nominees, N.Y.
Times, July 12, 2005, at A16.
10 Press Release, Sen. John McCain, Remarks by John McCain on Judicial
Philosophy (May 6, 2008), available at LEXIS, CQ Congressional Press
Releases file.
5
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“Kabuki theatre” with “rigidly structured performances featuring strictly
scripted role-playing by the leading characters.”11
This Article looks at the intersection of these two much-maligned
areas of American law, politics, and policy. It reviews the role that the
Second Amendment and other gun issues have played in the Senate’s
consideration of Supreme Court nominations over the past forty years,
and in doing so, it aims to provoke thinking about the role these issues
may play in future confirmation fights. While it was once rare for guns
even to be mentioned in the hearings or debate over Supreme Court
nominees, that is no longer the case. Gun issues played a particularly
prominent role in the Senate’s consideration of Samuel Alito, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, with the first suspected of being too hostile
to gun control measures and the latter two nominees accused of being
too inhospitable to gun rights. These nominations provide an interesting
perspective on how fairly the controversial and complicated legal issues
surrounding guns can be handled by nominees, senators, interest groups,
media, and others involved in or affecting the confirmation process. The
significance of gun issues in the assessment of potential justices will likely
continue to grow in the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark Second
Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller12 and McDonald v.
City of Chicago,13 cases that highlighted the importance of the gun debate’s
constitutional dimension and left a host of unresolved questions about
implementation of the newly invigorated right to keep and bear arms.
Part I of this Article looks back at Supreme Court nominations
and confirmations from the early 1970s to the mid-2000s. It describes
how the Second Amendment and other gun issues usually drew little
attention, even when the nominee’s record seemingly should have raised
significant questions in the minds of gun control advocates or gun rights
supporters in the Senate. On the few occasions when senators asked
gun-related questions, however, the nominees’ seemingly bland answers
sometimes offered telling clues about the positions they would later take
as members of the Court. Part II turns to the nomination of Samuel Alito
and looks closely at the controversy over a dissenting opinion he wrote,
while serving as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a case about the federal authority to regulate machine guns. I
11 Too Much Showmanship, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), July 17, 2009, at 14.
12 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
13 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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argue that the Senate’s confirmation hearings served a beneficial function
in this instance, providing an opportunity for a fairly reasonable and
sophisticated airing of the issue. Part III looks at how a Second Circuit
decision about the Second Amendment became one of the key weapons in
the arsenal of those opposed to Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination, and how
once again the confirmation hearings provided an important means of
pushing the debate away from crude distortions and oversimplifications
and toward a more fairly reasoned weighing of the real issues. Finally,
Part IV examines the impact of gun issues on the Senate’s consideration of
the most recent Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagan. In this instance,
many senators talked a great deal about guns, but unfortunately they
seemed eager to show off their zeal for gun rights but less interested in
actually using the confirmation hearings to learn about the nominee’s
experiences and views. After reflecting on these nominations, I conclude
the Article with some parting thoughts about confirmation battles to
come.
I. From Rehnquist to Roberts
It was not until the mid-1970s that gun control became an
intensely bitter and persistent national controversy. Before that, Congress
had passed a few significant firearm laws, but policy debates regarding
guns were sporadic and the level of rancor generated by the issue paled in
comparison to that of recent decades.14 No major organizations pushing
for stricter gun control measures even existed until 1974.15 On the
other side, the National Rifle Association (NRA) had been around for a
century, but focused on hunting, target shooting, and conservation, while
putting relatively little emphasis on political issues during most of that
time.16 Likewise, guns occupied little of the Supreme Court’s attention.
The Court had not said anything of real significance about the Second
Amendment or gun laws since 1939.17 Not surprisingly, then, guns were
14

See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control 109-16 (3d ed.
2004).
15 Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the
Great American Gun War, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 681, 690-91 (2004).
16 Spitzer, supra note 14, at 75-76, 81, 82.
17 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (rejecting a Second Amendment
challenge to federal prosecution for illegal possession of sawed-off shotgun).
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not an important issue when it came to scrutinizing Supreme Court
nominees. For example, no one mentioned anything about the Second
Amendment or gun control at the confirmation hearings conducted by
the Senate Judiciary Committee for William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell
in 197118 or for John Paul Stevens in 1975.19
No one else would be nominated for a seat on the Supreme Court
until Sandra Day O’Connor in the fall of 1981.20 By that point, the
modern battle lines on gun issues had begun to appear. The fledgling
national gun control organizations launched significant but largely
unsuccessful initiatives seeking to convince legislators and voters to ban
handguns.21 “Hardliners” took over the NRA, and they were determined
to ramp up the organization’s lobbying and electioneering efforts. They
fought more aggressively and uncompromisingly against any proposed
gun control measures.22 The murder of John Lennon in December 1980
and the attempted assassinations of President Ronald Reagan and Pope
John Paul II in the spring of 1981 drew new attention to the hazards of
guns in the wrong hands and further intensified the national debate over
the problem.23
Nevertheless, the constitutional and other legal issues surrounding
guns seemed to be of only mild interest to the senators weighing
O’Connor’s nomination. Republicans briefly quizzed O’Connor about
the Second Amendment at her confirmation hearings.24 When Strom
Thurmond, the arch-conservative Senator from South Carolina, asked
whether Congress could curtail the right to keep and bear arms, O’Connor
explained that United States v. Miller25 was the only major Supreme Court
precedent on the point, and that the Court, in Miller, decided that the
Second Amendment did not guarantee the right to have any certain type
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971).
Nomination of John Paul Stevens to Be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).
Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981) [hereinafter O’Connor Hearing].
Goss, supra note 15, at 691-93.
Spitzer, supra note 14, at 89-90.
See, e.g., Rudy Maxa, In Wake of Shootings, Handgun Control Folks Reap a Big
Harvest of New Supporters, Wash. Post Mag., Oct. 4, 1981, at 2.
O’Connor Hearing, supra note 20, at 134-35, 164-65.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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of weapon, and that lower courts generally had interpreted the Second
Amendment “as being a prohibition against Congress in interfering with
the maintenance of a State militia, which appeared to be the thrust of
the language in the amendment.”26 O’Connor added that many states
had laws restricting possession and use of guns in various ways, such
as laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed guns, and that these laws
were enacted pursuant to the “police power which is reserved to the
States.”27 O’Connor’s answer implied that she considered these laws to
be valid exercises of state authority, although she did not explicitly say
so. Thurmond did not comment on O’Connor’s response or ask any
other questions on the topic, suggesting that he was not terribly bothered
that O’Connor seemed more likely to support reasonable gun control
measures than to push for any dramatic expansion of gun rights.
That afternoon, another long-serving Republican, Bob Dole,
followed up with another question about the Second Amendment’s
effect.28 Like Senator Thurmond before him, Dole seemed to be offering
O’Connor a chance to make a statement about the importance of gun
rights, but her answer again leaned cautiously in the other direction.
O’Connor once again emphasized that the Supreme Court in Miller
had interpreted the Second Amendment as being a prohibition against
Congress interfering with the maintenance of state militias.29 She
reiterated that “the States, acting in their police power, had adopted a
wide range of statutes regulating the possession and use of firearms,”
adding that the right to own and use guns for sport purposes or selfdefense was well protected in most places, including in her home state
of Arizona, simply because legislators had chosen to put only limited
restrictions on guns.30 Like Thurmond, Dole let the subject drop without
further questions. O’Connor gave fairly guarded answers to Thurmond’s
and Dole’s queries, primarily sticking to factual observations rather than
expressing her personal views. To the extent that O’Connor’s answers
revealed something about her attitude toward guns, she sounded like a
moderate supporter of reasonable gun control measures, but the gun issue
simply did not play a prominent role in the consideration of O’Connor’s
26
27
28
29
30

O’Connor Hearing, supra note 20, at 135.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 165.
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nomination. O’Connor went on to win Senate approval by a 99-0 vote.31
Antonin Scalia walked an equally smooth path to approval by
the Senate in 1986.32 During his hearing before the Senate’s Judiciary
Committee, no one asked Scalia about the Second Amendment or anything
else relating to guns.33 Although Scalia’s track record as a member of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit included several interesting
cases relating to firearms,34 no one asked him to comment on those cases.35
On the same day that it unanimously approved Scalia’s appointment to
the Court, the Senate also confirmed William Rehnquist’s elevation to
Chief Justice.36 Again, no senator questioned Rehnquist about anything
relating to gun laws or the Second Amendment.37
Just a year later, Robert Bork became the next Supreme Court
nominee to go before the Senate for confirmation hearings. Bork’s
nomination, and ultimate rejection by the Senate, was replete with
controversy. Guns became a contentious issue in the Bork drama,
31

Fred Barbash, O’Connor Confirmed as First Woman on Supreme Court; Senate
Confirms O’Connor 99-0, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1981, at A1.
32 See Al Kamen, Rehnquist Confirmed in 65-33 Senate Vote; Scalia Approved as
Associate Justice, 98-0, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1986, at A1.
33 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986) [hereinafter Scalia Hearing].
34 See Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting claims that the NRA should be liable to the widow of a man killed
with a pistol and ammunition stolen from an NRA office); Nat’l Coal. to Ban
Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding that a person is not required to have a bona fide commercial
enterprise or business premises in order to obtain a federal license to sell
firearms). One witness at Scalia’s confirmation hearings, Audrey Feinberg of
the Nation Institute, a civil liberties research group, suggested that Scalia’s
decisions in these cases revealed him to be a right-wing extremist on legal issues
relating to gun control. Scalia Hearing, supra note 33, at 248.
35 Scalia would go on to write the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion about the
Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)
(striking down laws that banned handguns and required other guns to be kept
unloaded and either disassembled or secured by a trigger lock). See also
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
incorporates the right to keep and bear arms).
36 Kamen, supra note 32.
37 Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986).
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but only behind the scenes. Bork apparently had little interest in the
constitutional or policy issues surrounding firearms. Concerned that
Bork was not making a good impression in the Senate hearings, a White
House staff member advised Bork to try to steer the discussion toward
America’s great love affair with guns. Bork simply did not share that
passion:
Will Ball of the White House staff told Bork that he
needed to “score a few more points.” At one point, he
said, perhaps Bork could bring the discussion around to
the right to bear arms, a popular issue in the heartland.
Bork said he had never really thought about that right.
“Judge, goddamn, surely you’ve thought about the Second
Amendment,” protested Ball in his down-home southern
accent. “Not really,” Bork said, and the issue died. 38
In the flurry of recriminations within conservative circles after
Bork’s defeat, some complained that the NRA, one of the nation’s most
powerful lobbying groups, had stayed on the sidelines rather than joining
the push to confirm Bork. The NRA failed to come to Bork’s aid, even
though, as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Bork made several decisions favorable to the interests of gun advocates,39
and Bork-backers contacted every member of the NRA’s board in a lastditch effort to enlist the NRA’s support.40 The reasons for the NRA’s
inaction are the subject of sharp dispute. The NRA claimed that the
White House asked it to stay out of the fight over Bork because the NRA’s
help would be counterproductive and only serve to further polarize the
matter.41 Sources close to Bork offered a different explanation, saying
that the NRA was troubled by Bork’s opposition to the exclusionary
rule.42 Gun dealers frequently invoked that rule in seeking to suppress
38
39
40
41
42

Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook
America 238 (1989).
For example, Bork joined Scalia in rejecting tort claims brought against the
NRA. See Romero, 749 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and discussion supra note 34.
Patrick B. McGuigan & Dawn M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice: The Fight for
Bork 79 (1990).
Id.
Bronner, supra note 38, at 203; McGuigan & Weyrich, supra note 40, at 79.
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evidence from searches of their stores,43 while gun owners used it to fight
prosecution when police seized unregistered firearms from automobiles
during traffic stops.44 Bork’s son later criticized the NRA for failing
to back Bork because of its concerns about how Bork would influence
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.45
Ultimately, the NRA would not regret its failure to help Bork. A
few years after his failed nomination, Bork said that the original intent
of the Second Amendment was merely “to guarantee the right of states
to form militia, not for individuals to bear arms.”46 Perhaps relishing the
opportunity to take a stab at an organization that failed to help him, Bork
mocked the NRA for thinking that the Second Amendment “protects
their right to have Teflon-coated bullets.”47 He analogized the NRA’s
handling of the Second Amendment to the American Civil Liberties
Union’s treatment of the First Amendment,48 a comparison that, coming
from Bork, was a grave insult to the NRA.49
The legal and political issues surrounding guns thus wound up
playing an interesting but indirect role in the Bork saga. Compared to the
furor over Bork’s views on other issues like privacy and civil rights, guns
barely factored into the debate over whether the Senate should confirm
Bork’s nomination. Likewise, no one seemed interested in finding
43
44
45

See McGuigan & Weyrich, supra note 40, at 79.
Bronner, supra note 38, at 203.
R.H. Bork, Jr., The Media, Special Interests, and the Bork Nomination, in Ninth
Justice: The Fight for Bork, supra note 40, at 253.
46 Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. Times, Mar. 15,
1989, § 2, at 5; see also Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah 166
n.† (1996) (arguing that “[t]he Second Amendment was designed to allow
states to defend themselves against a possibly tyrannical national government”
and “[n]ow that the federal government has stealth bombers and nuclear
weapons, it is hard to imagine what people would need to keep in the garage to
serve that purpose”).
47 Miriam Bensimhon, The Advocates: Point and Counterpoint, Laurence Tribe and
Robert Bork Debate the Framers’ Spacious Terms, Life, Fall 1991, at 96.
48 Bork, supra note 46, at 152.
49 Bork apparently would later change his mind about the issue and join an amici
brief arguing that the Second Amendment broadly protects private possession
and use of guns unrelated to militia activities. Brief for Amici Curiae Former
Senior Officials of the Department of Justice in Support of Respondent, District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at 2008
WL 405551.
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out what Anthony Kennedy, the nominee that the Senate ultimately
confirmed in Bork’s place, thought about the Second Amendment or gun
control. The Senate Judiciary Committee did not ask Kennedy a single
question about those topics during his confirmation hearing.50 Kennedy,
of course, would go on to be the Court’s crucial swing vote in a plethora
of significant cases, including the most important Second Amendment
rulings in American history.51
The Senate Judiciary Committee continued to ignore gun issues
in considering subsequent confirmations, even when the nominee had
something in his or her background that seemingly warranted closer
scrutiny. For example, after President George H.W. Bush nominated
David Souter in 1990, gun control advocates uncovered a brief, signed by
Souter in 1976 when he was New Hampshire’s attorney general, arguing
that the Second Amendment provides no individual right to have guns
and instead protects only the states’ authority to maintain militias.52 The
brief made the argument in particularly vivid terms:
Even in the state of Texas, a jurisdiction steeped in the lore
of the wild west, of the quick draw and the showdown
at high noon, it has been held that the state may, in the
interest of public safety, prohibit carrying a pistol on
one’s person, despite a state constitutional guarantee of
the right to bear arms. Surely no contrary result could
be reached in a jurisdiction where no state constitutional
right to bear arms exists, and where the war whoop of
hostile Indians was last heard in 1763.53
The brief persuaded the New Hampshire Supreme Court to uphold a
conviction under the state’s law prohibiting unlicensed carrying of a
50
51
52
53

Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
(1987).
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Press Release, Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Souter’s Legal Brief Contradicts
NRA Claims on Second Amendment (Aug. 19, 1990), available at LEXIS, PR
Newswire file.
Id.
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loaded handgun.54 Although gun control proponents touted the brief as a
repudiation of the NRA’s interpretation of the Second Amendment,55 gun
rights proponents seemed unconcerned. Stephen Halbrook, a leading
advocate for the NRA and its constitutional theories, dismissed the brief
as something that likely was written by one of Souter’s underlings in the
attorney general’s office, was never seen by Souter, and bore his name
only as a formality.56 The NRA’s top lobbyist James J. Baker likewise
assured nervous gun enthusiasts that “[e]verything we have been able to
learn indicates that Souter looks at the Constitution from an historical
perspective.”57
If the NRA was not worried, that apparently was good enough
for its allies in the Senate. At Souter’s confirmation hearing, no one
mentioned the brief or asked him about his views on the Second
Amendment.58 Alan Simpson, a Republican from Wyoming, seemed to
be the only one itching to ask a question about guns, but it was an itch that
he narrowly managed to resist scratching. After questioning Souter about
other matters, Simpson found himself with a few minutes left and “a great
temptation” to ask Souter about gun control.59 Simpson then delivered
a rambling soliloquy about how attitudes toward guns vary dramatically
within the United States. He said, “[t]here is a sign in Massachusetts
on the border that says if you have a gun in your possession it is a $100
fine,” but “in Wyoming you carry a gun in the gun rack of your pickup
truck.”60 Simpson paused to note that his friend from Massachusetts,
apparently referring to Senator Ted Kennedy, had “an ever more intimate
and personal reason” to feel strongly about gun issues.61 “Talk about
crazies with arms, versus the legitimate citizen with his arms,” Simpson
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See New Hampshire v. Sanne, 364 A.2d 630 (N.H. 1976).
Press Release, supra note 52.
Steven A. Holmes, Gun-Control Group Heartened by ‘76 Souter Brief, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 19, 1990, § 1, at 17.
Jim Schneider, Vegetarian Fascists Stalk the Forest, Shooting Indus., Nov. 1,
1990, at 18.
Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
(1990).
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
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mused.62 In the end, Simpson opted not to ask a question, praised Souter
for being a good listener, and concluded “I guess I am not going to worry
about you at all” because “my President appointed you” and “I think
you are going to be a splendid, splendid judge.”63 Some years later as a
member of the Supreme Court, Souter would make clear that his position
on the Second Amendment was the sort that tended to be favored more
in Massachusetts than Wyoming,64 presumably to the dismay of Simpson
and other senators who favored gun rights but failed to ask Souter any
questions about that constitutional provision when they had the chance.
When Clarence Thomas came before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1991, Senator Simpson showed the same odd combination
of interest in gun issues but unwillingness to ask questions about them
during hearings. While chatting with a panel of witnesses who were there
to talk about Clarence Thomas’s views on issues concerning women,
Simpson noted that he had refrained from asking Thomas about the
Second Amendment during the hearing even though he knew that issue
mattered most to his constituents.65
I have been asked – I come from Wyoming, and I
get my lumps on the reproductive rights issue. But I get
another one. They say, Why don’t you ask him about
something that really is important to us, and that is ask
him about how he is on the 2d amendment and gun
control. Because if he is not right on that, Simpson, junk
him. Get him. We are counting on you to do that.
Well, I am not going to do that. I have asked him
about that, and he said, you know, he wasn’t going to get
62
63
64

65

Id.
Id.
Souter would be one of the dissenters when the Court struck down gun laws in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603-15 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting),
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 970-76 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting),
and District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822-47 (2008) (Souter
joined dissents by Justices Stevens and Breyer).
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
pt. 3, at 254 (1991). This was before the controversy over Thomas’s alleged
harassment of Anita Hill engulfed the nomination. See id. pt. 4.
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into anything of high controversy. . . .66
This time, Simpson’s faith in the nominee would not be misplaced, for
Clarence Thomas would turn out to be one of the Supreme Court’s most
ardent supporters of gun rights.67
By the time President Bill Clinton had the opportunity to make
Supreme Court nominations, gun control had become a contentious issue
that was frequently in the headlines. Clinton made gun issues a priority,
and he seemed to relish butting heads with the NRA.68 Momentum was
building in Congress for enactment of federal laws requiring background
checks for gun purchasers and prohibiting certain military-style “assault”
weapons.69 Not surprisingly, Clinton’s nominees faced some questions
about the Second Amendment during their confirmation hearings. For
example, Senator Orrin Hatch, a conservative Republican from Utah,
pressed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to explain why the right to keep and bear
arms should not be treated as applying to state and local governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment, like most other Bill of Rights
provisions.70 From the opposite end of the political spectrum, Senator
Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat and ardent gun control
supporter, invited Ginsburg and Clinton’s subsequent nominee Stephen
Breyer to endorse the proposition that the Second Amendment protects
only the right to keep and bear arms in connection with service in an
66
67

Id. pt. 3, at 254.
Long before he voted for a broad interpretation of the Second Amendment in
Heller, Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that foreshadowed the Supreme
Court’s move toward a more robust defense of gun rights. See Printz, 521 U.S.
at 898, 935-39 (Thomas, J., concurring). Indeed, Thomas hinted that he
thought the federal laws requiring criminal background checks on gun
purchasers might violate the Second Amendment, see id. at 938, a position that
would make Thomas a relatively militant defender of gun rights. Cf. Heller,
128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (providing presumption of validity to laws prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms and imposing conditions of the commercial sale
of firearms).
68 See, e.g., John King, Clinton Provides Ammo in Attack on Gun Lobby, Chi. SunTimes, Mar. 7, 1993, at 24.
69 See Spitzer, supra note 14, at 120-28.
70 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
128-29 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearing].
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organized militia like the National Guard.71 Ginsburg declined to reveal
anything about her views on the matter, saying “I am not prepared
to expound on it beyond making the obvious point that the second
amendment has been variously interpreted.”72 Breyer was a bit more
forthcoming. Like Ginsburg, he declined to express an opinion about
the Second Amendment’s meaning.73 He went out of his way, however,
to emphasize repeatedly that he believed there was a broad and virtually
unanimous consensus in America that many legal restrictions on guns can
be validly imposed.74
[E]very week or every month for the last 14 years, I have
sat on case after case in which Congress has legislated
rules, regulations, restrictions of all kinds on weapons;
that is to say, there are many, many circumstances in
which carrying weapons of all kinds is punishable by
very, very, very severe penalties. And Congress, often by
overwhelming majorities, has passed legislation imposing
very severe additional penalties on people who commit
all kinds of crimes with guns, even various people just
possessing guns under certain circumstances.
In all those 14 years, I have never heard anyone
seriously argue that any of those was unconstitutional in
a serious way. I should not say never because I do not
remember every case in 14 years. So, obviously, it is fairly
well conceded across the whole range of society, whatever
their views about gun control legislatively and so forth,
that there is a very, very large area for government to
act. . . .75
71

Id. at 241-42; Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 261-63 (1994) [hereinafter Breyer Hearing].
72 Ginsburg Hearing, supra note 70, at 128; see also id. at 241-42 (repeating that
the meaning of the Second Amendment was “a controversial question” that
“may well be before the Court again” and “it would be inappropriate for me to
say anything more than that”).
73 Breyer Hearing, supra note 71, at 262.
74 Id. at 262-63.
75 Id. at 262.
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While Breyer followed these remarks with the perfunctory reminder that
he could not say how he would decide particular questions that might
come before the Court in the future, anyone even mildly attuned to the
debate over gun issues in America could have easily predicted that Breyer
would favor giving governments wide latitude to regulate guns in the
interest of public safety. And when the Supreme Court finally tackled
the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, that is exactly
what Breyer did.76 His dissenting opinion in Heller struck exactly the
same chord as the remarks he made about the Second Amendment at
his confirmation hearing, emphasizing the pragmatic reasons why courts
should defer to reasonable legislative determinations that gun control
laws will advance significant public policy goals like reducing crime and
injuries.77
A decade later, during his confirmation hearings to become the
Court’s Chief Justice, John Roberts would give similarly revealing clues
about his views on the Second Amendment during what seemed to be an
innocuous deflection of a question. Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat
from Wisconsin with a mixed record on gun issues,78 asked whether
Roberts believed the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
have guns for private purposes or only a collective right to keep and bear
arms in connection with militia service.79 Roberts declined to express a
view on the matter, explaining that there was a circuit split on the issue
and so it was likely to be a question before the Supreme Court at some
point.80 But after brushing off the question in that routine way, Roberts
dropped a subtle but significant hint about his real views on the Second
Amendment. Referring to the Supreme Court’s last major ruling on the
right to keep and bear arms, United States v. Miller,81 Roberts said:
76
77

78
79
80
81

128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847-70 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2847; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3124-29,
3134-38 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should defer to
reasonable state legislative determinations about costs and benefits of gun
regulations).
For an eloquent explanation of Feingold’s middle-of-the-road approach to gun
issues, see 108 Cong. Rec. S1964-65 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004).
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 360 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing].
Id. at 360-61.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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I know the Miller case side-stepped that issue. An
argument was made back in 1939 that this provides only
a collective right, and the Court didn’t address that. They
said instead that the firearm at issue there – I think it was
a sawed-off shotgun – is not the type of weapon protected
under the militia aspect of the Second Amendment.
So people try to read into the tea leaves about Miller and
what would come out on this issue, but that’s still very
much an open issue.82
To those deeply immersed in the Second Amendment debate, this was
a dead giveaway, like a “tell” that reveals the strength of a poker player’s
hand. “When he said that, it was a signal, to my ears,” explained Dennis
Henigan, the lead lawyer at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence.83
While gun control advocates had long taken the position that Miller
conclusively rejected the “individual rights” interpretation of the Second
Amendment, gun rights advocates insisted that Miller “side-stepped” the
question and it was still an “open issue.”84 Sure enough, just a few years
later, Roberts would go on to be part of the Supreme Court majority
finding that Miller had side-stepped the issue and concluding that the
Second Amendment provides an individual right unconnected to militia
service.85
Gun control issues and the Second Amendment thus generally
played a surprisingly limited role in the evaluation of Supreme Court
nominees in recent decades, even though political and legal controversies
surrounding guns grew more intense during this time. In most instances,
no one on the Senate Judiciary Committee even bothered to ask about
the nominee’s views on gun issues. When someone did broach the
82
83

Roberts Hearing, supra note 79, at 361.
Tony Mauro, Both Sides Fear Firing Blanks if D.C. Gun Case Reaches High
Court, Law.com, July 30, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=900005556503.
84 Id.
85 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813-14 (2008) (finding
that Miller addressed only the type of weapons covered by the Second
Amendment and said nothing about the type of people or activities protected
by the provision).
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subject, the results were often quite interesting. Even when trying to give
a bland, uncontroversial answer, nominees like Stephen Breyer86 and John
Roberts87 let some striking clues slip about their fundamental stances in
the gun debate. Guns never became a key issue for any Supreme Court
nominee, however, until the three most recent high court hopefuls,
Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, had their chances to
go before the Senate seeking confirmation.
II. Machine Gun Sammy
Guns became a significant issue in the debate over Samuel Alito’s
nomination largely because of a dissenting opinion that Alito wrote in
United States v. Rybar while serving as a member of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.88 The Rybar case concerned the federal laws
that regulate machine guns.89 Since the passage of the National Firearms
Act of 1934, machine guns have been subject to a special federal system
of registration, taxation, and other restrictions.90 In 1986, Congress went
further and essentially cut off the supply of new machine guns to the
civilian market, allowing automatic weapons already registered under the
National Firearms Act to remain in circulation but prohibiting registration
of any other machine guns.91
Raymond Rybar ran afoul of these federal laws when he sold
two submachine guns to a firearms collector at a gun show in western
Pennsylvania in 1992.92 Rybar learned about machine guns while
serving as a U.S. Army paratrooper in Vietnam,93 and he had a small
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-294 (3d Cir. 1996).
A machine gun is an automatic weapon, meaning that it can fire more than one
shot with a single pull of the trigger. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2006).
See id. §§ 5801-72; Allen Rostron, High Powered Controversy: Gun Control,
Terrorism, and the Fight over .50 Caliber Rifles, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1415, 142834 (2005).
See Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(9), 100 Stat.
449, 452-53 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006); Rostron, supra
note 90, at 1434.
Rybar, 103 F.3d at 275.
Defendant’s Response to Government’s Objections to Presentence Report and
Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, United States v. Rybar, Crim. No.94-243
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metalsmithing business that included repairing machine guns and making
parts for them.94 Although Rybar had federal licenses authorizing him to
manufacture and sell firearms, the submachine guns he sold at the gun
show were not registered under the National Firearms Act.95 When the
collector ran into trouble with federal law enforcers, he named Rybar as
the source of the submachine guns96 and a grand jury soon indicted Rybar
for illegally possessing and transferring the two weapons.97
The district court threw out the charges against Rybar for illegally
transferring unregistered machine guns, concluding that it would be
fundamentally unfair to punish a person for failing to register weapons
that Congress’s 1986 enactment had made impossible to register.98
However, the district court upheld the charges of unlawful possession of
machine guns. Rybar entered a conditional guilty plea to those charges,
maintaining his right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the
federal laws underlying his conviction.99
Rybar began serving an eighteen-month prison sentence,100 but
hoped that the Third Circuit would overturn his conviction on appeal.
Although he would also rely on the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms, his chief argument was that Congress had exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause by prohibiting purely intrastate
possession of unregistered machine guns.101
Just a few days before the due date for Rybar’s appellate brief,102
the Supreme Court issued a decision that provided surprising new

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1995), http://www.titleii.com/bardwell/us_v_rybar_brf2.
txt (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
Wyndle Watson, Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Good Fortune, Pitt. PostGazette, Aug. 29, 1993, at D16.
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing en banc,
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3185), http://
www.titleii.com/bardwell/us_v_rybar_brf6.txt (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
Id.
Rybar, 103 F.3d at 275.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brief for the Appellant at 7-24, United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir.
1995) (No. 95-3185), 1995 WL 17197799.
See id. at 12-24.
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support for Rybar’s position. In United States v. Lopez,103 the Supreme
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made
it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm within one thousand
feet of a school.104 The Court concluded that, in enacting the statute,
Congress exceeded its authority to regulate interstate commerce because
the possession of a gun near a school is not a commercial activity.105 The
statute applied to all firearms, not just those proven to have a connection
to or effect upon interstate commerce.106 Citing Lopez, Rybar argued that
if the federal government does not have the power to ban possession of
firearms near schools, it also does not have the power to punish him for
possession of machine guns.107
Judge Alito agreed. He saw no basis for distinguishing the law
struck down in Lopez from the federal statute restricting possession of
machine guns under which Rybar had been convicted.108 In Alito’s view,
the Lopez decision was not merely a “constitutional freak”; instead, it
showed that “the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits
on congressional power.”109 Alito emphasized that his position on the
issue would not prevent lawmakers from enacting “adequate regulation”
of machine guns.110 Congress could cure the constitutional defect
in the statute by making credible findings that possession of machine
guns substantially affects interstate commerce, by assembling sufficient
evidence to that effect, or by adding a jurisdictional element to the statute
so that federal prosecutors would be required in each case to prove that
103 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
104 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25)-(27), 922(q), 924(a)(4)).
105 514 U.S. at 561.
106 Id. at 561-62. After Lopez, Congress amended the statute that had been struck
down, making it apply only to “a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise
affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000),
amended by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 369-71 (1997). The amended statute has been upheld
as a valid exercise of federal authority over interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999).
107 United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1995).
108 Id. at 286-87 (Alito, J., dissenting).
109 See id. at 286.
110 Id. at 287.
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the defendant’s machine gun had moved in or otherwise affected interstate
commerce.111 Alito also pointed out that even if the federal government
did not regulate machine gun possession, every state would remain free
to do so.112
Unfortunately for Raymond Rybar, Judge Alito was the only
one of the three judges on the Third Circuit panel in the case who saw
the issue that way. Over Alito’s dissent, the other two judges voted to
uphold Rybar’s conviction on the ground that Congress reasonably could
have believed that banning possession of machine guns would have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.113 The vast majority of federal
appellate judges across the nation similarly found that the machine gun
statute is valid,114 although a few judges in other circuits shared Alito’s
sentiment that the statute exceeds Congress’s proper reach.115
As soon as Alito’s nomination to join the Supreme Court was
announced on October 31, 2005,116 his dissenting opinion in Rybar
became a key element in the debate over the nomination. Alito’s supporters
hailed the Rybar dissent as a courageous defense of gun rights.117 Critics
condemned it as a prime example of Alito’s “aggressively outlying record”
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
Id. at 282-83 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 93-97 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 29-31 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kenney,
91 F.3d 884, 886-91 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948,
951-52 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519-22 (10th
Cir. 1995).
115 See United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 787-88 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 798-802
(5th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d
1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the federal government could ban possession
of a machine gun that had been transferred from one person to another at some
point before being illegally possessed, but not a homemade machine gun
produced and possessed only by defendant himself ), vacated, 545 U.S. 1112
(2005), remanded to 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the federal law
even for a homemade machine gun).
116 President George W. Bush & Judge Samuel A. Alito, Remarks by President
George W. Bush at Announcement of His Nomination of Judge Samuel A. Alito to
the Supreme Court of the United States (Oct. 31, 2005), available at LEXIS,
Federal News Service file.
117 See, e.g., Editorial, A Supreme Nomination, Wash. Times, Nov. 1, 2005, at A18.
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as a judge.118
Interest groups opposed to Alito’s nomination quickly bestowed
on him the nickname “Machine Gun Sammy.”119 Their creative efforts
to draw attention to the Rybar dissent included production of a “wanted”
poster, declaring that Alito had been consorting with “practically
criminal organizations, including the NRA” and that he should be
considered “armed (with extreme political views) and dangerous (to the
nation’s future).” 120 The “wanted” poster featured an image of Alito’s
face photoshopped onto the body of a dapper Prohibition-era gangster
holding a “Tommy” submachine gun.121
Some observers felt this sort of dramatization of Alito’s record
went too far. They complained that depicting Alito as a gangster, even in
a way obviously not meant to be taken literally, tapped into stereotypes
about Italian-Americans and organized crime.122 Others complained that
gun control advocates had oversimplified the issue presented in Rybar
too much by, for example, portraying Alito as “favor[ing] legal machine
guns.”123
118 Cragg Hines, ‘Scalito?’ Nothing Is ‘Lite’ About Bush’s Newest Pick, Hous. Chron.,
Nov. 1, 2005, § B, at 9.
119 Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, ‘Machine Gun
Sammy,’ a Perfect Halloween Pick, Says Brady Campaign (Oct. 31, 2005),
available at LEXIS, PR Newswire file.
120 Gun Guys, WANTED: “Machine Gun Sammy,” http://www.gunguys.com/
mgsammy.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter WANTED: “Machine
Gun Sammy”]. GunGuys was at the time a project of the Freedom States
Alliance (which subsequently merged into States United to Prevent Gun
Violence). Gun Guys, About Us, http://www.gunguys.com/?page_id=3598
(last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
121 WANTED: “Machine Gun Sammy,” supra note 120.
122 See, e.g., M. Charles Bakst, Italian-Americans and the Alito Nomination,
Providence J. (R.I.), Jan. 10, 2006, at B-01; Elizabeth Gudrais, Panel Says
Alito Critics Recycling Stereotypes, Providence J. (R.I.), Jan. 6, 2006, at B-01;
Rosario A. Iaconis, Opinion, Alito Can Be Proud of His Heritage: Critics of the
Court Nominee Are Resorting to Anti-Italian Smears, but He Has a Majestic
Patrimony Behind Him, Newsday (N.Y.), Nov. 30, 2005, at A39.
123 E.g., Vincent Carroll, Editorial, On Point: The “Machine Gun” Lie, Rocky
Mtn. News (Denver), Nov. 2, 2005, at 41A (quoting Press Release, supra note
119); Eugene Volokh, Brady Campaign Misrepresents Judge Alito’s Position on
Machine Gun Possession, Volokh Conspiracy, Nov. 5, 2005, http://volokh.
com/posts/1131223466.shtml (quoting Press Release, supra note 119).
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Of course, one must bear in mind that rhetorical exaggeration and
hyperbole are routine tools of issue advocacy groups across the political
spectrum. Special interest groups struggle mightily to arouse support and
draw attention to their messages, and, in doing so, they inevitably employ
a certain degree of dramatic license. Just as the law affords leeway to the
“puffery” of merchants hawking their wares,124 or the overheated raves of
Hollywood publicists,125 we can expect and tolerate rhetorical flourishes
from interest groups that we might condemn if they came from other
sources like scholars, journalists, or politicians.
The Rybar dissent was a significant topic of discussion during
Alito’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.126
Alito and the senators handled the issue in a reasonable and fair manner.
Before Alito had even begun to speak, several senators brought up the
Rybar case in their opening statements. In measured terms, they advised
Alito of their concerns about his Rybar dissent and how it suggested that
Alito had an unduly narrow view of congressional authority. No one
claimed that Alito had taken a frivolous position in Rybar or accused him
of seeking to flood the streets with automatic weapons. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, for example, rightly pointed out that Alito wanted to strike
down the machine gun law “based essentially on a technicality.”127 In other
words, rather than undercutting federal power in any truly significant
way, Alito’s position in Rybar would have forced the federal government
to jump through some additional hoops to accomplish essentially the
same end result. Feinstein and other senators certainly were entitled to
be skeptical of what seemed to be a hyper-technical approach to federal
authority in the Rybar dissent and to quiz Alito about whether he would
similarly seek to minimize federal power in future instances when the
stakes might be much higher.
At the hearing, Alito had fair opportunities to defend his Rybar
124 See David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 3.2, at 123 (2d ed. 2008).
125 See Presidio Enterprises v. Warner Bros. Distrib., 784 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting fraud claims against film studio that declared its movie about killer
bees invading America would be a blockbuster hit).
126 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing].
127 Id. at 26; see also id. at 38 (statement of Sen. Schumer) (expressing concern
about whether Alito still holds the “cramped views of congressional power”
evident in his Rybar dissent).
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dissent. He explained why he felt it was consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Lopez and why it posed no significant obstacle to
strict government regulation of machine guns.128 Alito emphasized that
his “position in Rybar was really a very modest position, and it did not go to
the question of whether Congress can regulate the possession of machine
guns.”129 He noted that his opinion spelled out how “it would be easy for
Congress” to fix the statute by making more specific findings about how
possession of machine guns generally affects interstate commerce or by
requiring prosecutors to prove in each case brought under the statute that
the particular machine gun in question had some connection to interstate
commerce.130 Alito conceded that he might have reached a different
conclusion if the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Gonzales v.
Raich,131 which upheld federal authority to ban medical use of marijuana,
had been available to him when Rybar was decided.132
At one point during the proceedings, Senator Arlen Specter
described Supreme Court nomination hearings as “a subtle minuet,
with the nominee answering as many questions as he thinks necessary in
order to be confirmed.”133 Senator Joe Biden later said he hoped Alito’s
hearing could be a conversation rather than a minuet, because “we – you
and I and this Committee – owe it to the American people in this one
democratic moment to have a conversation about the issues that will
affect their lives profoundly.”134 Unfortunately, the Alito hearing did
not generate an informative and useful airing of every issue. Alito, for
example, purported not to know enough about Bush v. Gore,135 one of
the most famous and important decisions in recent history, to be able to
128 See, e.g., id. at 377-78, 395-98, 406-07, 444-45, 633. To the extent that anyone
said anything arguably misleading about the machine gun issue during the
hearing, it was when Alito’s supporters cited a Ninth Circuit ruling as support
for Alito’s views but neglected to mention that the ruling had been vacated by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. at 377 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (referring to
United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S.
1112 (2005), remanded to 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006)).
129 Alito Hearing, supra note 126, at 377.
130 Id. at 377-78.
131 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
132 Alito Hearing, supra note 126, at 628-29.
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id. at 18.
135 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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say whether it was rightly decided.136 He obfuscated rather than trying to
shed any real light on hot-button issues like abortion.137 But with respect
to the Rybar issue, Alito’s hearing generally fulfilled the hopes for more
than a meaningless minuet. The hearing provided a fair exploration of
Alito’s position in Rybar and a reasonably sophisticated dialogue about
differing conceptions of the reach of the federal government’s commerce
power.
Rybar was not a major point of discussion when the Judiciary
Committee met a few weeks later and voted on sending Alito’s nomination
to the full Senate.138 Although the Committee remained divided over the
nomination, with all ten Republicans voting in Alito’s favor and all eight
Democrats voting against him, interest in Rybar and gun control in general
had receded to the point where only a few of the committee’s members
mentioned those matters in the remarks preceding and explaining their
votes.139 To the extent that senators mentioned gun issues, the discussion
seemed to move back in the direction of oversimplification and away from
the careful and precise articulation of the issues that had characterized the
dialogue with Alito at the hearings. For example, Senator Herb Kohl, a
Democrat from Wisconsin, complained that Alito “was in the extreme
minority of judges around the country when he found that Congress has
no ability to regulate machine guns.”140 Again, Alito arguably took an
unduly narrow and exacting view of congressional authority in Rybar.
He would have forced Congress to be more precise in its findings about
how machine guns affect interstate commerce or perhaps limit the federal
statutes so that they would apply only to machine guns shown to have
136 Alito Hearing, supra note 126, at 386.
137 See, e.g., id. at 432-34.
138 The Nomination of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court: Meeting of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at LEXIS, Federal News Service
file [hereinafter Alito Committee Meeting].
139 Id. (statements of Senators Kohl, Feinstein, and Schumer).
140 Id. At the press conference following the committee vote, Senator Charles
Schumer similarly characterized Alito as having taken the position that “the
federal government can’t regulate machine guns.” Sen. Harry Reid et al., Press
Conference with Democratic Leaders and Members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee Following Committee Vote on Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (Jan. 24, 2006), available at LEXIS,
Federal News Service file.
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some connection to interstate commerce.141 The fact that Alito would
make Congress take those steps to revise the machine gun laws might
suggest that Alito would limit Congress’s ability to act in other important
contexts where its ability to work around the Supreme Court’s objections
might be less clear. As Senator Feinstein argued to her fellow Judiciary
Committee members before their vote, Alito had merely made a technical
objection to the way in which Congress enacted the machine gun law, but
that sort of nitpicking about federal authority might suggest that Alito, if
allowed to become a member of the Supreme Court, would be inclined
to make it very difficult for Congress to pass additional laws relating to
gun violence and other important issues like worker safety and consumer
protection.142 While it oversimplifies the issue to say Alito’s position
would have left Congress with no ability to regulate machine guns,
legitimate reasons for concern about Alito’s vision of federal authority
certainly existed.
A few days later, the same general pattern emerged in the full
Senate’s debate on Alito’s nomination. In a few isolated instances, Alito’s
critics oversimplified or exaggerated the Rybar issue. For example, Senator
Barbara Boxer warned that if the Senate confirmed Alito, “our children
could end up living in a very different America,” one where “[d]angerous
automatic weapons might become broadly available.”143 But most senators
simply and fairly argued that Rybar and other evidence in Alito’s record
suggested Alito would take a restrictive view of congressional authority,
not just for firearms but also with respect to other significant issues like
civil rights, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, and major
federal programs like Social Security and Medicare.144 In response, Alito’s
supporters in the Senate offered a plausible defense of the Rybar dissent,
saying it merely represented Alito’s conscientious effort to follow Supreme
Court precedent and pointing out that Alito provided “a virtual roadmap
for how Congress could regulate the possession of guns in a way consistent
141
142
143
144

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Alito Committee Meeting, supra note 138.
152 Cong. Rec. S310 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2006) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S342-43 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Chafee); 152 Cong. Rec. S152 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein); 152 Cong. Rec. S69 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Clinton); Id. at S85 (statement of Sen. Reed).
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with the Constitution and Supreme Court case law.”145
The process led to a reasonable exploration and airing of the issue.
In the end, attentive observers, including senators on both sides of the
aisle, surely knew that Alito was unlikely to lead a judicial crusade to
wipe out all legal restrictions on machine guns. But at the same time his
dissenting opinion in Rybar was a telling indication that he would tend
to take a relatively narrow view of federal authority in general, and that
he was likely to look favorably on gun rights arguments in particular.
In short, the senators knew what they were getting with Alito, and they
confirmed his nomination, albeit by a fairly narrow margin, with 58
senators voting for Alito and 42 voting against him.146 Alito lived up to
expectations by becoming a crucial fifth vote for the majority opinion in
Heller, a decision unlikely to bring about unfettered access to automatic
weapons,147 but one that nevertheless dramatically re-drew the lines in
constitutional law with respect to guns.148
III. The Gun Grabbers’ Dream Come True
Gun enthusiasts seemed to draw little reassurance from the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the Second Amendment in
Heller. Barack Obama’s victory in the presidential election in November
2008 sparked a binge of gun purchases across the nation.149 Although
the Obama Administration has thus far been uninterested in doing
anything relating to firearms (except making it legal to carry them in
more places),150 many Americans remain convinced that a crackdown on
145 152 Cong. Rec. S304 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
146 152 Cong. Rec. S348 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006).
147 To date, courts have shown no inclination to believe that Heller casts doubt on
the validity of federal restrictions on machine guns. See, e.g., Hamblen v.
United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fincher, 538
F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2008).
148 Alito would go on to write the opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020 (2010), concluding that the right to keep and bear arms applies to
state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
149 Allen Rostron, Cease Fire: A “Win-Win” Strategy on Gun Policy for the Obama
Administration, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 347, 347-48 (2009).
150 See Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, President Obama’s First
Year: Failed Leadership, Lost Lives 2 (2010) (giving Obama a report card
with all “F” grades for his handling of gun policy issues during his first year in
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gun access is somehow right around the corner.151
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller left many questions
unanswered, one of the most crucial being whether the right to keep and
bear arms should be “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment so
as to restrain the actions of state and local governments.152 Although
the Bill of Rights applies directly only to the federal government, the
Supreme Court has decided, in a string of rulings stretching over many
years, that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are fundamentally
important and therefore apply to state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.153 For example, freedom
of speech is expressly protected against federal infringement by the First
Amendment, but freedom of speech is also a fundamental part of what
it means to receive due process of law as promised by the Fourteenth
Amendment.154 The Supreme Court has balked at incorporating only a
few Bill of Rights provisions, most notably the Fifth Amendment’s clause
requiring serious criminal prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury
indictments and the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a
jury trial in civil cases.155 Without incorporation of the right to keep and
bear arms, Heller’s impact would be dramatically limited. States, cities,
and counties could remain free to ban or restrict guns in any manner.
In several cases decided more than a century ago, such as United
States v. Cruikshank156 and Presser v. Illinois,157 the Supreme Court indicated
that the Second Amendment could be infringed only by the federal
government and did not apply to the states. Those rulings, however, were
issued before any part of the Bill of Rights had been incorporated into
office).
151 See Rostron, supra note 149, at 347-48.
152 See generally John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law
§ 10.2, at 396-99 (7th ed. 2000) (providing an overview of the Bill of Rights
provisions and their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment). The
Supreme Court would answer this question, a year after Heller, in the case of
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). See infra notes 265-266
and accompanying text.
153 Id.
154 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
155 See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 152, § 10.2, at 397-98.
156 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
157 116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886); see also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538
(1894).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.158 As the incorporation movement gained
steam during the twentieth century, the Supreme Court never had an
occasion to revisit the question of whether the right to keep and bear arms
should be incorporated.159 Cases like Cruikshank and Presser therefore
took on an odd status as the years passed. Everyone knew these decisions
were at least in some sense obsolete because they predated the emergence
of the contemporary approach to incorporation questions. The rulings
were incomplete in their reasoning, even if not necessarily wrong in their
results. But the Supreme Court had never overruled them, and therefore
they remained binding precedents that lower courts had an obligation to
follow. The Supreme Court has emphasized many times that it alone has
the authority to decide when one of its past decisions should be overruled,
and lower courts should resist the temptation to take it upon themselves
to say that a Supreme Court ruling is archaic and no longer controls.160
Even when the Supreme Court, in Heller, finally addressed the
Second Amendment for the first time in many years, the Court was able
to avoid the incorporation question because the case involved laws of a
jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, that is a special federal territory
and not a state. The majority opinion in Heller included a footnote
acknowledging that the incorporation issue was not before the Court but
would need to be decided in the future since old decisions like Cruikshank
and Presser “did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry
required by our later cases” and therefore did not settle the point.161
The incorporation issue soon popped up in courts around the
country. Relying on Heller, litigants challenged the constitutionality
of state and local legal restrictions on weapons. Jim Maloney was one
individual who brought such a challenge, although it was unusual in that
the case did not involve guns. Maloney lives on Long Island in New
158 The first step in the line of Supreme Court decisions incorporating Bill of
Rights provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment is generally considered to be
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
159 The incorporation issue did not come up in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 175 (1939), the only significant Second Amendment case heard by the
Supreme Court in the twentieth century, because that case involved a
constitutional challenge to a federal statute rather than a state law.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
161 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813, n.23 (2008).
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York. He is a lawyer, a U.S. Naval Reserve officer, a former paramedic,
and a long-time student and practitioner of martial arts.162 In the early
1970s, when Maloney was in high school, he began studying karate.163
At that time, a boom in the popularity of “kung fu” movies had drawn
attention to martial arts devices known as “nunchaku,” “nunchucks,” or
“chukka sticks.”164 These devices consist of two pieces of wood or other
hard material connected by a cord or chain.165 Skilled users can swing the
nunchaku from hand to hand and around their bodies using a variety of
intricate techniques and patterns. Maloney explained that his interest in
nunchaku stemmed in part from the fact that they are good weapons for
defending against knife attacks. When Maloney was five years old, an
attacker killed Maloney’s father with a knife.166
Late in the summer of 2000, a telephone company employee
working outside Maloney’s home complained that Maloney pointed a
rifle at him.167 Although the worker alleged that Maloney threatened
him with the gun and said “I’ll shoot you,”168 Maloney claimed that
he merely looked at the worker through a telescope attached to a cane,
which Maloney used for bird watching, and the worker had mistaken the
contraption for a rifle with a scope.169 In any event, police soon arrived,
and Maloney refused to let them enter his home because they did not have
a warrant.170 Maloney also refused to come out of the house, and so a
162 Amended Verified Complaint at 4-5, Maloney v. Spitzer, No. 03 Civ. 0786
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2005).
163 See Jim Maloney, Forbidden Sticks: A Four-Century Blog Tour (1609-2009),
http://nunchakulaw.blogspot.com/ (July 4, 2009).
164 See, e.g., Enter the Dragon (Concord Productions Inc. 1973); Way of the
Dragon (Concord Productions Inc. 1972); Fist of Fury (Golden Harvest Co.
1972).
165 Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 554 F.3d
56 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded sub nom.,
Maloney v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
166 Maloney, supra note 163.
167 Id.
168 Brief of Defendant-Appellee Kathleen A. Rice at 5, Maloney v. Cuomo, 554
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-0581-CV) [hereinafter “District Attorney’s
Brief ”].
169 Maloney, supra note 163; High Court May Review Personal Weapons Ruling
(NPR radio broadcast June 1, 2009), available at LEXIS, National Public Radio
file.
170 District Attorney’s Brief, supra note 168, at 5; Maloney, supra note 163.
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twelve-hour standoff ensued.171 At two o’clock in the morning, Maloney
finally relented and surrendered to police, who then searched the house
and seized weapons including a nunchaku found under a couch.172 Police
charged Maloney with several criminal offenses including possession of
the nunchaku.173 Possession of nunchaku has been prohibited in New
York since 1974,174 although Maloney asserts that he was unaware the law
banned mere possession in one’s own home.175
Maloney eventually agreed to plead guilty to disorderly conduct,
and in return prosecutors dropped all other charges including the
nunchaku possession offense.176 Maloney nevertheless felt that New
York’s ban on nunchaku was unconstitutional, so he filed a lawsuit against
the state’s attorney general and local district attorney seeking to have the
nunchaku law declared invalid as an infringement of freedom of speech,
the right to keep and bear arms, and unenumerated rights protected by
the Ninth Amendment.177 A federal district court dismissed Maloney’s
case and upheld the New York nunchaku ban.178 Maloney appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Supreme Court boosted Maloney’s hopes by handing down
its decision in Heller while Maloney’s case was still pending on appeal.
At oral argument before the Second Circuit panel, Maloney quipped
that his arguments about the right to keep and bear arms may have
looked like “the work of someone who was insane” when he filed his
briefs, but after Heller he was “in good company.”179 Sonia Sotomayor,
171 District Attorney’s Brief, supra note 168, at 5; Maloney, supra note 163.
172 District Attorney’s Brief, supra note 168, at 5; Maloney, supra note 163.
173 Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207-08 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 554
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded sub nom.,
Maloney v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
174 N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(1) (2008).
175 See Maloney, supra note 163.
176 Maloney, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 208; District Attorney’s Brief, supra note 168, at 6.
177 Maloney, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 208, 211. Maloney also sued a newspaper for libel
in its coverage of the incident, see Maloney v. Anton Cmty. Newspapers, Inc.,
791 N.Y.S.2d 598, 598-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), and sued the police and
others involved, see Maloney v. County of Nassau, 623 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). He also founded a new organization, called the National
Alliance for Relief from Nunchaku Intolerance in America, or NARNIA. High
Court May Review Personal Weapons Ruling, supra note 169.
178 Maloney, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
179 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir.
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one of the Second Circuit judges in Maloney’s case, pointed out that the
Supreme Court in Heller had not resolved the incorporation issue and
suggested that her court remained obligated to follow the old Supreme
Court precedents, like Cruikshank and Presser, which found the Second
Amendment inapplicable to state laws.180 “I think we have abundant case
law,” Sotomayor observed, “that says we have to follow Supreme Court
precedent that’s directly on point.”181
A month later, Sotomayor’s reasoning carried the day when the
Second Circuit issued its brief per curiam decision in the case.182 The
court affirmed the dismissal of Maloney’s challenge to the nunchaku ban,
noting that Supreme Court precedent squarely contradicted Maloney’s
argument that the right to keep and bear arms extends to state and local
governments.183 Although that precedent was old and arguably obsolete,
“[w]here, as here, a Supreme Court precedent has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to the Supreme Court the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions.”184 Unless and until the Supreme Court opted to
overturn its old precedents and find that the right to keep and bear
arms is a fundamental right deserving heightened protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, only the lowest form of “rational basis” scrutiny
could be applied, and New York’s ban on nunchaku conceivably could
serve a legitimate government purpose because nunchaku are potentially
dangerous weapons.185 In short, Judge Sotomayor and her Second Circuit
colleagues chose the path of judicial restraint over activism, leaving it to
the Supreme Court to decide whether keeping and bearing arms is among
the fundamental rights incorporated and applied against state and local

180
181
182
183
184
185

2009) (No. 07-0581-CV), available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~jmm257/
argument-corrected.pdf.
Id.
Id. Later in the argument, Sotomayor suggested that nunchaku might not be
“arms” within the Second Amendment’s meaning. Id.
Maloney, 554 F.3d at 58-60, cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded sub
nom., Maloney v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59 (quoting Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 59-60.
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governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Maloney decision initially sparked no great outcry, even
from the most ardent gun rights proponents, because it simply reached
the conclusion that the Supreme Court soon would need to address
the incorporation issue. This is not to say that Maloney’s reasoning was
indisputable. Some scholars believed that if lower courts read the old
Supreme Court cases like Cruikshank and Presser very exactingly, they could
conclude that those old cases foreclosed incorporation via the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause but did not squarely address
and therefore did not preclude lower courts from finding the right to
keep and bear arms incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause.186 This approach requires a very delicate parsing of the old
opinions, because in every one of them the Supreme Court rejected due
process as well as privileges or immunities arguments.187 Nevertheless,
drawing a subtle distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment’s
clauses, a Ninth Circuit panel soon concluded, contrary to the Maloney
decision’s approach, that they did not need to wait for the Supreme Court
to incorporate the right to keep and bear arms.188
At that point, a circuit split existed. It was an odd split because
each circuit’s reasoning ultimately would lead to exactly the same spot.
The Ninth Circuit would incorporate the right. The Second Circuit
would leave it up to the Supreme Court to incorporate the right. Either
way, it was clear that the Supreme Court would soon resolve the issue.
186 See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Anticipating Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role
of the Inferior Courts, 59 Syracuse L. Rev. 185, 190-93 (2008) (discussing the
possibility that Second Amendment rights could be incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause).
187 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 539 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
267-68 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553-54, 557-59
(1875).
188 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 446-47, 450, 454-57 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit soon decided to rehear the case en banc, and in doing so declared
that the original panel’s opinion could no longer be cited as precedent by or to
the Ninth Circuit. See Nordyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2009).
After hearing argument, the en banc court then opted to wait and let the
Supreme Court resolve the issue. See Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763 (9th Cir.
Sept. 24, 2009). After the Supreme Court made its decision in McDonald, the
Ninth Circuit vacated the original panel’s opinion and remanded the case to
that panel for further consideration in light of McDonald. See Nordyke v. King,
No. 07-15763, 2010 WL 2721856 (9th Cir. July 12, 2010).
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Given that the five justices who constituted the majority in Heller were
still on the Court, the Court was virtually certain to rule that the right to
keep and bear arms is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore applies to state and local governments.
The Maloney decision thus was, in truth, a decision of remarkably
little consequence. It nevertheless suddenly became a cause célèbre for
many in the gun rights camp when President Obama offered Judge
Sotomayor a promotion to the nation’s highest court. Commentators
immediately began to scrutinize the Maloney opinion, looking for any
telltale signs it contained about Sotomayor’s stance on gun issues.
Many ardent defenders of gun rights offered fair assessments of
the Maloney case. For example, UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh, a
noted supporter of gun rights, acknowledged that Sotomayor did not do
anything radical in the Maloney case.189 Volokh guessed that Sotomayor
probably would be a gun control proponent, simply because she was
nominated by Obama and had never said anything favorable about
gun rights, but he recognized that the Maloney opinion revealed little
about her views on the issue.190 Robert Levy, the libertarian lawyer and
writer who initiated the Heller litigation and thus would be one of the
first inductees in any Second Amendment hall of fame, similarly found
that Sotomayor’s decision in Maloney was “well within the bounds of
responsible judging.”191 Even Jim Maloney, the nunchaku afficianado
against whom Sotomayor and the Second Circuit had ruled, felt that it
was unfair to use his case as evidence that Sotomayor would be hostile to
gun rights as a member of the Supreme Court. He told reporters:
I did not expect to win. I’ll say that much. And, you
189 Morning Edition: Sotomayor’s Second Amendment Record (NPR radio broadcast
June 1, 2009), available at LEXIS, National Public Radio file.
190 Id.; see also Jacob Sullum, Guns in Unincorporated Territory, Reason.com, June
17, 2009, http://reason.com/archives/2009/06/17/guns-in-unincorporatedterritory (“The bottom line is that an intellectually honest judge could have
gone either way on the question of whether Supreme Court precedents foreclose
incorporation of the Second Amendment. Sotomayor, a left-leaning Greenwich
Village resident chosen by a president who never met a gun control he didn’t
like, probably is not a big fan of the Second Amendment. But this particular
case does not prove it.”).
191 Robert Levy, Sotomayor and the Second Amendment, FindLaw, July 31, 2009,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20090731_levy.html.
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know, it was clear to me that they had a very solid basis for
saying that the Second Amendment is not incorporated,
and that essentially they are powerless to do anything
about it. They had a defensible position there.192
Other gun rights proponents were sharper in critiquing the
Maloney opinion but fair in doing so. For example, David Kopel, one
of the most prolific writers on gun rights issues, questioned whether the
relatively cursory dismissal of Fourteenth Amendment issues in Maloney
might signal that Sotomayor had more “hostility, rather than empathy,”
for gun owners and their rights.193 That sort of analysis was a reasonable
attempt to find whatever clues might exist about Sotomayor’s attitude
toward gun issues.
The criticism of Sotomayor’s views quickly grew more intense.
Newspapers reported that the NRA was “deeply troubled” by the
“clear hostility Sotomayor has shown toward their most cherished
ideals.”194 Another gun rights group, the Gun Owners of America,
not only denounced Sotomayor as an “anti-gun radical,” but claimed
her decision in Maloney “displayed contempt for the rule of law under
the Constitution.”195 Again, a certain amount of hyperbole should be
expected from these types of issue advocacy groups.196 But too often,
the discussion of Maloney degenerated into crude oversimplifications
and distortions. Senators opposed to her nomination went on television
to suggest, quite erroneously, that Sotomayor had refused to follow
the Supreme Court’s holding that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right.197 Conservative politician and pundit Ken Blackwell
192 High Court May Review Personal Weapons Ruling, supra note 169.
193 David Kopel, Sonia Sotomayor Versus the Second Amendment, Volokh
Conspiracy, May 26, 2009, http://volokh.com/2009/05/26/sonia-sotomayorversus-the-second-amendment/, available at LEXIS, Newstex file.
194 Charles Hurt, NRA’s Big Guns Holding Fire – For Now, N.Y. Post, May 29,
2009, at 15.
195 Press Release, Gun Owners of America, Obama Picks Anti-Gun Judge for the
Supreme Court (May 29, 2009), available at http://gunowners.org/a052909.
htm.
196 See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., State of the Union with John King: Interview with Senators Hutchison,
Klobuchar; Interview with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (CNN
television broadcast May 31, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison), available at
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perhaps went the furthest, penning an inflammatory broadside claiming
that Obama’s nomination of Sotomayor was a “declaration of war against
America’s gun owners and the Second Amendment.”198 Blackwell did not
bother to say anything – not a single word – about how Sotomayor and
her Second Circuit colleagues may have reasonably believed they were
bound by Supreme Court precedents.199
Blogs and other websites became particularly fertile sources of
wild characterizations and misinformation. One essay that circulated
widely on the internet dubbed Sotomayor “A Gun-grabber’s Dream Come
True.”200 Within just a few hours after her nomination, a report appeared
on the internet claiming that one of Sotomayor’s “legal theses” written
at Princeton University was entitled “Deadly Obsession: American Gun
Culture.”201 According to this report, the thesis explained that the Second
Amendment not only failed to give any right to individual citizens, but it
actually made it illegal for them to own firearms.202 Most readers failed
to notice a small tag at the bottom of the story that said “satire,” and the
story quickly ricocheted around the internet. The report was immediately
debunked as an obvious fraud,203 but commentators across the electronic
world continued to pass it off as true.204
Just a few days after the announcement of Sotomayor’s nomination,
LEXIS, CNN Transcripts file.
198 Blackwell originally posted his essay, entitled “Obama Declares War on
America’s Gun Owners,” on a blog on the Fox News website. It is no longer
available there, but can still be found on miscellaneous sites around the internet,
such as at http://activitypit.ning.com/form/topics/ken-blackwell-obamadeclares.
199 See id.
200 Kurt Nimmo, Sotomayor on the Supreme Court: A Gun-grabber’s Dream Come
True, Infowars, May 28, 2009, http://www.infowars.com/sotomayor-on-thesupreme-court-a-gun-grabbers-dream-come-true/.
201 See Nathan Figler, Obama’s Supreme Pick, American News Inc., May 26,
2009,
http://jumpinginpools.blogspot.com/2009/05/sotomayor-gunownership.html.
202 Id.
203 See David Kopel, Highly Dubious Claim Against Sotomayor, Volokh
Conspiracy, May 26, 2009, http://volokh.com/2009/05/26/highly-dubiousclaim-against-sotomayor/, available at LEXIS, Newstex file.
204 See, e.g., Gun Owners of America, supra note 195 (claiming that the national
Fox News network had reported on Sotomayor’s radical anti-gun thesis);
Nimmo, supra note 200.
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision that
should have laid to rest the hysterical fulminations about Maloney. In
that decision, written by Judge Frank Easterbrook and joined by Judge
Richard Posner, two of the nation’s foremost conservative legal minds, the
Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Maloney opinion.205
The Seventh Circuit judges found that the old Supreme Court decisions
like Cruikshank and Presser were still binding on them. Arguments about
why those old cases should be overruled and the right to keep and bear
arms should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment “are for
the Justices rather than a court of appeals.”206
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling made it unmistakably clear that
Maloney, at the very least, was well within the mainstream of judicial
thinking on the subject and did not reflect radical reasoning or defiance
of precedent. To those determined to spread false fears about Sotomayor’s
nomination, it made no difference. Members of the Senate, for example,
went on suggesting that the Second Circuit’s opinion in Maloney had
somehow defied the Supreme Court’s Heller decision and its interpretation
of the Second Amendment.207 Sotomayor and her colleagues on the
Second Circuit panel in Maloney went out of their way to respect and
defer to the Supreme Court’s authority, and this is what they got in return
for it.
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings before the Senate’s Judiciary
Committee gave her a chance to address the Maloney case and the
unfair distortions being thrown about by her critics.208 As soon as she
got a chance to speak on the issue, Sotomayor said that she accepted
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller as establishing that the Second
Amendment is an individual right.209 She explained that Heller did not
decide the incorporation issue, and she explained why she and her Second
Circuit colleagues in the Maloney case concluded that only the Supreme
205 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir.
2009), rev’d sub nom., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
206 Id. at 860.
207 See, e.g., Sen. Jeff Sessions et al., Press Conference: The Supreme Court Nomination
of Judge Sonia Sotomayor (June 24, 2009), available at LEXIS, Federal News
Service file.
208 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Hearing].
209 Id. at 67.
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Court itself could overrule its older cases and incorporate the right to
keep and bear arms into the Fourteenth Amendment.210 She added that
she would have an open mind about the incorporation issue if serving
as a justice when the Supreme Court decided that issue,211 although she
would recuse herself if Maloney was the case in which the Court chose
to grant certiorari.212 Acknowledging the varying feelings about guns in
America, Sotomayor mentioned that “one of my godchildren is a member
of the NRA, and I have friends who hunt,” and she emphasized that
she understood “how important the right to bear arms is to many, many
Americans.”213
Senators nevertheless proceeded to question her at great length
about Maloney, incorporation, and the right to keep and bear arms.214
They made grandiose pronouncements about how the right to own
guns “may very well hang in the balance with your ascendency to the
Supreme Court.”215 Sotomayor’s presence, however, meant that they
simply could not get away with distorting or oversimplifying the matter
to the same extent that they could in speeches, press conferences, or
television interviews. Whenever the Senators tried to portray Maloney
as representing some sort of bold defiance of Supreme Court precedent,
Sotomayor was there to remind them that the core point of the Maloney
opinion was that lower courts should humbly defer to the Supreme Court’s
authority and not presumptuously declare a higher court’s precedents to
be obsolete.216 The Maloney case “was decided on the basis of precedent,”
she repeated over and over, and when there is Supreme Court precedent
on point, only the Supreme Court can decide what to do, and in the
meantime, the lower courts’ hands are tied.217 When the senators tried to
portray Maloney as the work of wildly radical liberal judges, Sotomayor
was there to point out that the conservative jurists of the Seventh Circuit
had reached exactly the same conclusion.218
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 113.
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 208, at 68.
Id. at 86-90, 112-15, 117-19, 344-47, 357, 393-95, 423-25, 439, 444-45.
Id. at 444 (statement of Sen. Coburn).
E.g., id. at 343-46, 394-95, 397, 444, 457-59.
Id. at 444.
E.g., Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 208, at 74, 394, 439, 444.
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Those senators who were skeptical of Sotomayor’s views had to
backpedal and talk about the issue in more specific, precise, and accurate
ways to continue pressing the point. They had to acknowledge that the
issue was complicated and that their criticism of Sotomayor actually rested
on a relatively subtle disagreement about a fairly technical point of law.
Sotomayor’s supposed sin, they eventually had to concede, was that she
had not parsed the Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century cases carefully
enough to realize that they only precluded her court from finding the right
to keep and bear arms incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
privileges or immunities clause and did not definitively close the door to
incorporation via the due process clause.219 To put it mildly, this was an
awfully slender reed on which to base the conclusion that Sotomayor was
a manipulative ideologue hellbent on pursuing a radical anti-gun agenda.
Meanwhile, the questioning gave Sotomayor the opportunity to hammer
home the simple, understandable message that it makes sense for major
constitutional issues to be decided by the nation’s highest court.220 The
longer and deeper the discussion went on the issue, the more it sounded
like Sotomayor had a fairly straightforward, common-sense position,
while the senators questioning her were splitting hairs and obsessing over
arcane legal trivia.
Indeed, one of the moments in the hearings that got widespread
attention occurred during Senator Hatch’s questions about Maloney
and whether Sotomayor’s position in that case meant she would vote
to uphold virtually any state or local weapons ban. Sotomayor calmly
said, “Sir, in Maloney we were talking about nunchuck sticks.”221 She
methodically proceeded to explain the nature and potential danger of
these items. To many observers, that moment epitomized the tenor of
the entire proceeding. Sotomayor was being pragmatic, while senators
like Hatch played partisan politics and endlessly dwelled on trifles like the
right to keep and bear nunchucks.222
219 Id. at 89-91 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Exec. Business Meeting of the S.
Judiciary Comm.; Subject: Comm. Vote on the Nomination of Judge Sonia
Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 111th Cong., July 28,
2009 [hereinafter Sotomayor Comm. Meeting] (statement of Sen. Sessions),
available at LEXIS, Federal News Service file.
220 See, e.g., Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 208, at 89.
221 Id. at 90.
222 See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., White Man’s Last Stand, N.Y. Times, July 15,
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As the nomination made its way out of the Judiciary Committee
and toward a vote in the full Senate,223 the NRA announced that, for the
first time in its history, it would oppose the confirmation of a Supreme
Court nominee.224 In addition, the NRA declared that it would be
“scoring” the vote, meaning that it would count the vote as part of its
annual ratings of legislators’ performances.225 Insiders reported that the
NRA initially was not inclined to score the vote, perhaps realizing that
Sotomayor’s confirmation was inevitable and preferring not to tarnish
its reputation as an interest group that legislators dared not defy.226
Republican leaders in the Senate, however, persuaded the NRA to take
a stronger stand, hoping it would help to reduce Sotomayor’s margin of
victory.227
Senators largely met the NRA’s position “with a shrug.”228 In
the debate preceding the vote to confirm Sotomayor’s nomination,
senators talked frequently and in great detail about the Maloney case and
the Second Amendment.229 But while Sotomayor’s critics could say that
they did not like her decision and that failure to incorporate the Second
Amendment would drastically undercut the constitutional protection of
the right to keep and bear arms,230 it was difficult to portray Sotomayor as
2009, at A25; Dana Milbank, Grasping at Nunchucks in the Hearing Room,
Wash. Post, July 15, 2009, at A7.
223 The Judiciary Committee voted 13 to 6 in favor of Sotomayor. Sotomayor
Comm. Meeting, supra note 219.
224 David G. Savage & James Oliphant, Sotomayor Vote a Power Play; Senators’
Choices May Show Extent of Influence Held by NRA, Obama, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4,
2009, at C11.
225 Tony LoBianco, NRA Sets Sights on Senators Who Back Sotomayor in Vote, Wash.
Times, July 24, 2009, at A7.
226 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, NRA Takes Aim at Sotomayor and Some Senators Take
Cover, News J. (Wilmington, Del.), Aug. 2, 2009.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S8905-07 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); id. at S8940 (statement of Sen. Hutchinson); 155 Cong. Rec. S881213 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Crapo); id. at S8821 (statement
of Sen. Kyl); id. at S8842-43 (statement of Sen. Sessions); 155 Cong. Rec.
S8738 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
230 See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S8811-12 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Barrasso); 155 Cong. Rec. S8735-36 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Sessions); id. at S8747 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at S8783 (statement
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having taken a radical or extreme position.231 The Second Circuit’s ruling
in Maloney was unanimous, the Seventh Circuit’s conservative judges had
reached the same conclusion,232 and the Ninth Circuit had just granted
an en banc rehearing in the only case where a federal appellate court had
gone the other way.233 It is tough to characterize someone as being outside
the judicial mainstream on an issue where she adopts the majority view.
As Senator Sheldon Whitehouse put it, Sotomayor’s ruling in Maloney
was “properly conservative in a judicial sense.”234 Again, the senators
opposed to Sotomayor’s nomination were left to pick nits and split hairs,
for example, by complaining that the Maloney opinion was too “cursory”
because it devoted only one paragraph to the incorporation issue while
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion had taken two and a half pages to reach the
same conclusion.235 One senator went so far as to say the real problem
was that Sotomayor had too much respect for precedent,236 a charge
that others rightly recognized as leaving judges “caught in a Hobson’s
choice” because any judge too quick to reject precedents would surely be
condemned for judicial activism.237
In the end, Sotomayor won the votes of every Democrat in the
Senate, even those from conservative states where the NRA maintains great
of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
231 Compare 155 Cong. Rec. S8928 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Conrad) (expressing hope that Supreme Court would incorporate the right to
keep and bear arms but nevertheless finding that Sotomayor’s record “has been
very much in the judicial mainstream on gun issues”), and 155 Cong. Rec.
S8797 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Martinez) (explaining that
Sotomayor’s position in Maloney was “too narrow and contrary to the Founders’
intent,” but “not out of the mainstream”), with id. at S8795 (statement of Sen.
Burr) (insisting that Sotomayor had ignored the Heller decision and reached “a
conclusion no other court has ever reached”), and id. at S8814 (statement of
Sen. Wicker) (arguing that Sotomayor’s decision in Maloney had been “certainly
out of the mainstream” because it relied on nineteenth-century caselaw
“arguably” superseded by Heller).
232 See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 188.
234 155 Cong. Rec. S8743 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009).
235 See 155 Cong. Rec. S8842-43 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Sessions).
236 See 155 Cong. Rec. S8897 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen.
DeMint).
237 See id. at S8906 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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influence.238 She also picked up the votes of nine Republicans, including
two – Lindsay Graham and Lamar Alexander – who had received “A”
ratings from the NRA in the past.239 While some political observers
believed that Sotomayor would have received additional support from
Republicans but for the NRA’s scoring of the vote,240 others felt that the
gun issue wound up having no impact on the results.241 Matthew Dowd,
a former political strategist for President George W. Bush, said “gun rights
had nothing to do with it”; most Republicans opposed Sotomayor simply
because “Supreme Court nominations have become dodgeball games,
with Democrats lining up on one side and Republicans lining up on our
side.”242
IV. Another Anti-Gun Radical
Both teams began warming up for the next round of battle over a
Supreme Court nomination as soon as Justice John Paul Stevens announced
in April 2010 that he soon would be retiring from the Court.243 Before the
ink was dry on Stevens’s resignation letter, talk had already turned to what
the records of the leading candidates to replace him might reveal about
their views on the Second Amendment and other gun policy issues.244
238 155 Cong. Rec. S8945 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009); Charlie Savage, Senate
Confirms Sotomayor for the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2009, at A1.
239 The NRA’s grades for Graham, Alexander, and other 2008 Senate candidates
can be found at http://www.votesmart.org/issue_rating_detail.php?r_id=4229.
The other seven Republicans who voted for Sotomayor had nothing to fear
because they already had poor ratings from the NRA or were on the verge of
retirement. See Chris Cillizza, Sotomayor and the 2010 Races, Wash. Post, Aug.
10, 2009, at A2.
240 David G. Savage & James Oliphant, NRA Ad Takes on Kagan, Sotomayor; The
Group Urges Members to Tell Their Senators ‘Not to Fall for the Same Trick Twice’,
L.A. Times, July 14, 2010, at A12 (reporting that White House officials believe
the NRA’s opposition took away up to ten votes from Sotomayor).
241 Savage, supra note 238.
242 Id.
243 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Justice Stevens Retiring, Giving Obama a
2nd Pick, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1.
244 See Kurt Hofmann, How Justice Stevens’ Retirement Might Benefit Gun Rights,
St. Louis Gun Rights Examiner, Apr. 10, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/
x-2581-St-Louis-Gun-Rights-Examiner~y2010m4d10-How-Justice-Stevensretirement-might-benefit-gun-rights; David Kopel, Diane Wood on the Second
Amendment, Volokh Conspiracy, Apr. 9, 2010, http://volokh.
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Gun rights proponents warned that they needed to brace themselves for
another nominee with “radical” views on gun control.245
At that point, little was known about Elena Kagan’s views on
guns.246 She had never been a judge and therefore never decided any
cases about guns, and she had not written about gun issues during her
time as a law professor. When President Obama announced in May
2010 that Kagan would be the nominee, initial news reports emphasized
that she had taken a moderate, cautious approach to gun issues when
she appeared before the Senate the previous year to be confirmed as the
nation’s solicitor general, saying that she had “no reason to believe” Heller
was wrongly decided and that “there is no question that the Second
Amendment guarantees individuals the right to keep and bear arms and
that this right, like others in the Constitution, provides strong although
not unlimited protection against governmental regulation.”247 Skeptics,
however, felt sure that Obama would not have nominated Kagan unless
she favored strict gun control measures.248
Those scouring Kagan’s past for clues soon found several
documents that fueled concerns about Kagan being hostile to gun
rights. The earliest was from 1987, when Kagan worked at the Supreme

245
246

247

248

com/2010/04/09/diane-wood-on-the-second-amendment/; David Kopel,
Merrick Garland Is No Friend of the Rights of Gun Owners, Volokh Conspiracy,
Apr. 10, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/04/09/merrick-garland-is-no-friendof-the-rights-of-gun-owners/.
Press Release, Rep. Todd Tiahrt, Rep. Tiahrt Comments on President Obama’s
Next Supreme Court Nominee (Apr. 10, 2010), available at LEXIS, US Fed
News file.
See David Kopel, Potential Supreme Court Nominee Records on the Second
Amendment, Volokh conspiracy, Apr. 11, 2010, http://volokh.
com/2010/04/11/potential-supreme-court-nominee-records-on-the-secondamendment/ (describing Kagan’s record on Second Amendment issues as
“Unknown”).
Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for Court, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 2010, at A1; Robert Barnes, High Court Nominee Never Let
Lack of Experience Hold Her Back, Wash. Post, May 10, 2010, at A5; On the
Issues: Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, Wash. Post, May 11, 2010, at A7.
See, e.g., Chuck Norris, The New Abortion, Creators Syndicate, May 10, 2010,
available at LEXIS, Creators Syndicate file (stating that evidence of Kagan’s
beliefs about gun control was “extremely scarce” but asking “[t]hen again, does
anyone suppose Obama’s desire to appoint her implies her conservative stance
on the Second Amendment?”).
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Court as a law clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall.249 Kagan had the
task of reviewing some of the many certiorari petitions that continually
pour into the Supreme Court. One petition, in the case of Sandidge v.
United States,250 was brought by a person who claimed that the District
of Columbia had violated his right to keep and bear arms by convicting
and punishing him for unlicensed possession of a pistol. Kagan wrote a
terse note to Justice Marshall, describing the case and saying that she was
“not sympathetic” to the petitioner’s Second Amendment claim.251 The
Supreme Court unanimously denied the petition, declining to hear the
case.252
Kagan would not have a reason to think much about gun issues
again until about a decade later when she went to work as a lawyer and
policy advisor for President Clinton. The White House actively pursued
a number of gun control efforts during that time, such as a push to
promote the availability of trigger locks for handguns and to require
background checks for all gun purchasers at gun shows.253 Documents
indicated that Kagan played some role in a number of these initiatives.
For instance, after the Supreme Court ruled in Printz v. United States
in 1997 that Congress could not force state and local law enforcement
officers to carry out background checks on gun purchasers,254 Kagan
suggested that Clinton might deal with the problem by issuing executive
249 See Greg Stohr & Kristin Jensen, Kagan Said She Was ‘Not Sympathetic’ Toward
Gun-Rights Claim, Bloomberg, May 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-05-12/kagan-said-she-was-not-sympathetic-toward-gun-rightsclaim-in-1987-memo.html.
250 See Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
868 (1987). The court decisions contain no explanation of the circumstances
surrounding Sandidge’s arrest. According to one account, Sandidge worked at
a laundromat where there had been several robberies and he carried a pistol to
protect himself while transporting cash receipts for the laundromat. See
William J. Olson, Testimony on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, July 1, 2010, http://judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/07-01-10%20Olson%20Testimony.pdf.
251 Stohr & Jensen, supra note 249.
252 Sandidge v. United States, 484 U.S. 868 (1987).
253 See James Oliphant, Gun Rights Could Be Obstacle for Kagan; The Supreme Court
Nominee’s Stance Isn’t Clear, but the NRA Is Expressing Concern, L.A. Times, May
28, 2010, at A14; James Oliphant & Richard A. Serrano, Documents Paint
Kagan as a Pragmatist, L.A. Times, June 5, 2010, at A14.
254 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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orders that would prohibit firearms dealers from selling handguns where
law enforcement agencies refused to conduct the background checks.255
For most gun control issues that arose during Kagan’s time in
Washington, however, the precise extent of Kagan’s involvement was
unclear. For example, gun rights proponents quickly fixated on a
presidential memorandum, signed by Clinton in 1997, which directed the
Treasury Department (which at that time included the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms) to crack down on imports of certain foreignmade “assault type” rifles.256 Kagan’s name appeared on a cover sheet
accompanying a draft of the memorandum, and some reports suggested
that Kagan had drafted the memorandum and was “deeply involved”
in the issue.257 But according to Bruce Reed, who was Clinton’s chief
domestic policy advisor and Kagan’s boss at the time, the memorandum
was written by someone else, Kagan merely transmitted it to Clinton
as requested, and thus the presence of Kagan’s name on the cover sheet
was a meaningless formality.258 This is the sort of factual uncertainty
that ideally would be resolved during the confirmation process, including
Kagan’s hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Perhaps the most provocative document from Kagan’s days in the
Clinton Administration was a sheet of handwritten notes which seemed to
characterize the NRA in an unflattering way.259 While analyzing proposed
legislation that would protect non-profit organization’s volunteer workers
from tort liability in some instances,260 Kagan apparently asked a Justice
255 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Glimpses of Kagan’s Views in Clinton White House, N.Y.
Times, June 5, 2010, at A10.
256 The cover sheet and memorandum can be found at http://www.clintonlibrary.
gov/Documents/Kagan%20-%20Bruce%20Reed/Kagan%20-%20Bruce%20
Reed%20-%20Crime%20Series/Box%2080%20Assault%20Weapons.pdf.
257 Josh Gerstein, Clinton Centrist in W.H. Memos, Politico.com, May 12, 2010,
available at LEXIS, Politico.com file.
258 Mike Allen, Kagan Signed Weapons Memo, Politico.com, May 12, 2010,
available at LEXIS, Politico.com file.
259 See Robert Verbruggen, Did Kagan Compare the NRA with the KKK? Nat’l Rev.
Online, June 18, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/232102/didkagan-compare-nra-kkk-robert-verbruggen.
260 The bills, see Volunteer Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 911 and S. 1435, 104th
Cong. (1995), eventually became law as the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450114505).
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Department official to check whether the NRA or the Ku Klux Klan
would be among the organizations receiving protection under the bill.261
In notes taken during a conversation with that official, Kagan listed the
NRA and KKK under the heading of “bad guy” organizations.262 To
Kagan’s critics, this suggested she was “so hostile to gun rights that she
would compare the top gun-rights organization in the United States with
a viciously racist hate group.”263
Kagan’s past thus contained significant fodder for Senators
interested in asking about gun issues at her confirmation hearings.264 Just
a few hours before those hearings began, the U.S. Supreme Court focused
further attention on guns by announcing its decision in McDonald v. City
of Chicago.265 By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the right to keep and
bear arms applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause.266 As with Heller, gun rights advocates
cheered the result, but worried about the narrow margin of victory. In
their view, the case underscored the need for close scrutiny of Supreme
Court nominees like Kagan, for “the personal right of every American
to own a gun hangs by a single vote on the Supreme Court.”267 The
261 Verbruggen, supra note 259.
262 Kagan’s notes, along with a memorandum from the Justice Department
attorney working with her on the matter, were among documents released by
the William J. Clinton Presidential Library and available at http://www.
clintonlibrary.gov/KAGAN%20DPC%201/DPC%20-%20Box%20070%20
-%20Folder%20006.pdf#page=19).
263 Verbruggen, supra note 259.
264 Official transcripts of Kagan’s hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee
have not yet been released, but unofficial versions are available. See, e.g., Senate
Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan Nomination,
June
28,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/07/01/AR2010070103025_pf.html [hereinafter Kagan Hearing June 28, 2010]; Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena
Kagan Nomination, June 29, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY2.pdf [hereinafter Kagan Hearing June 29, 2010]; Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena
Kagan Nomination, June 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY3.pdf [hereinafter Kagan
Hearing - June 30, 2010].
265 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
266 Id.
267 Kagan Hearing – June 28, 2010, supra note 264 (statement of Sen.
Sessions).
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McDonald decision also left some senators feeling betrayed by Sonia
Sotomayor.268 Testifying at her hearing before the Judiciary Committee
a year earlier, Sotomayor had said that she understood and accepted
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller as establishing that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right,269 but Sotomayor nevertheless
joined the dissenters in McDonald who found “nothing in the Second
Amendment’s text, history, or underlying rationale that could warrant
characterizing it as ‘fundamental’ insofar as it seeks to protect the keeping
and bearing of arms for private self-defense purposes.”270
While the circumstances suggested that Kagan might be
subjected to a long and detailed interrogation about every aspect of her
past work relating to guns, Senators spent surprisingly little time quizzing
Kagan about those matters. Senator Jon Kyl asked about Kagan’s notes
characterizing the NRA and KKK as bad organizations.271 Kagan claimed
that she was merely jotting down things that someone else said and that
equating the NRA with the KKK would be “ludicrous.”272 Senator
Chuck Grassley asked Kagan about the Sandidge case and why, as
Justice Marshall’s law clerk, she was “not sympathetic” to the petitioner’s
Second Amendment claim in that case.273 Kagan explained how the
legal landscape had shifted dramatically since 1987, when she reviewed
268 See Kagan Hearing – June 29, 2010, supra note 264 (statement of Sen. Cornyn);
Kagan Hearing – June 30, 2010, supra note 264 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
269 Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 208, at 68-69.
270 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor). Of course, Sotomayor might argue that her
dissenting vote in McDonald did not contradict her Senate testimony. For
example, she might contend that she merely testified that she understood the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller, not that she necessarily agreed with it and
would vote to reaffirm it. She could also argue that believing the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not necessarily mean believing
that right is fundamental in the sense required for incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Compare David Kopel, Sotomayor Targets Guns Now;
Justice’s Dissent Contradicts Confirmation Testimony, Wash. Times, June 30,
2010, § B, at 1, with Adam Shah, Conservative Media Figures Falsely Accuse
Sotomayor of Testifying Untruthfully on Gun Rights, Media Matters for
America, June 29, 2010, http://mediamatters.org/blog/201006290037.
271 Kagan Hearing – June 29, 2010, supra note 264.
272 Id.
273 Id.

The Past and Future Role of the Second Amendment and Gun Control 169
in Fights Over Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees
the certiorari petition in Sandidge.274 At that time, there were no lower
court decisions finding the Second Amendment applicable to private,
individual activity unrelated to militia service.275 Twenty years later, when
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Heller case, there was a distinct split
among the circuits, and the issue was ripe for review.276 Senator Grassley
also gave Kagan the opportunity to explain the suggestions she had made
about how the Clinton Administration should respond to the Printz
decision.277 Of course, Kagan’s explanations of these matters would not
persuade everyone, but at least the questioning gave her the opportunity
to tell her side of the story.
In many other respects, significant questions went unasked.
No one inquired about the extent to which Kagan handled any of the
other significant gun control issues, such as trigger locks, gun shows, and
lawsuits against gun manufacturers, that arose while she worked for the
Clinton Administration. Indeed, no one asked Kagan about President
Clinton’s effort to ban imports of assault weapons, or why Kagan’s name
appeared on the cover sheet of the draft presidential memorandum on that
topic.278 Kagan’s critics trumpeted that issue as a key part of her record
of anti-gun extremism,279 and yet no senator on the Judiciary Committee
asked Kagan about the extent of her involvement in the matter. Kagan’s
opponents in the Senate often seemed to avoid asking questions that
would give Kagan an opportunity to undermine their criticisms of her.
Senator Jeff Sessions, for example, declared at the outset of the hearings
that Kagan was “the central figure in the Clinton-Gore efforts to restrict
gun rights,” but then had no questions for Kagan about any of the work
that she did on gun control issues.280
Rather than asking questions to which Kagan might be able to
give a concrete answer, several Senators pressed her about the meaning of
the Second Amendment and the precedential significance of the Heller
274
275
276
277

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kagan Hearing – June 30, 2010, supra note 264; see supra notes 254-55 and
accompanying text.
278 See supra note 256-258 and accompanying text.
279 See, e.g., Brian Darling, Kagan Bad on Guns, Human Events Online, May 14,
2010, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=36973 (describing the
issue as “a ‘smoking gun’ that indicates Kagan’s extensive anti-gun activism”).
280 Kagan Hearing – June 28, 2010, supra note 264.
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and McDonald decisions.281 These questions came from Senators on both
sides of the political spectrum, with some worried that Kagan would be
too quick to overrule these precedents and others fearing that she would
be too reluctant to do so. These were basically rhetorical questions,
for Kagan naturally provided the same generic response to them all.
She would give the same respect to Heller and McDonald as any other
Supreme Court precedents.282 She might vote to follow the precedents,
and she might vote to overrule them if sufficient reasons existed for doing
so.283 She would not make any promises more specific or binding than
that.284 Senator John Cornyn complained that this was exactly the sort
of vague explanation of stare decisis that Sonia Sotomayor had offered
when asked about Heller at her confirmation hearings a year earlier, and
yet Sotomayor had gone on to join the dissenters in McDonald and their
conclusion that there is no fundamental constitutional right to keep and
bear arms for private self-defense purposes.285
Just after the hearing’s conclusion, the NRA issued a letter stating
that it opposed Kagan’s confirmation because “throughout her political
career, she has repeatedly demonstrated a clear hostility” to the right
to keep and bear arms.286 The Judiciary Committee nevertheless soon
voted to approve Kagan’s nomination and send it to the full Senate for
consideration.287 During the Senate’s debate, the Second Amendment
was one of the primary concerns raised by those opposed to Kagan’s
confirmation.288 As evidence of her hostility to gun rights, Senators cited
281 Kagan Hearing – June 29, 2010, supra note 264; Kagan Hearing – June 30,
2010, supra note 264.
282 Kagan Hearing – June 29, 2010, supra note 264; Kagan Hearing – June 30,
2010, supra note 264.
283 Kagan Hearing – June 29, 2010, supra note 264.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Letter from Wayne LaPierre & Chris Cox to Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. Jeff
Sessions, July 1, 2010, http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/Kagan.pdf.
287 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Panel Backs Kagan Nomination, with One Republican
Vote, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2010, at A11.
288 See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S6614 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); id. at S6615 (statement of Sen. Inhofe); id. at S6624 (statement of Sen.
Cornyn); id. at S6670-6671 (statement of Sen. Grassley); id. at S6675 statement
of Sen. LeMieux); 156 Cong. Rec. S6686-6687 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2010)
(statement of Sen. Hutchison); id. at S6694 (statement of Sen. Murkowski); id.
at S6695 (statement of Sen. Chambliss); id. at S6702 (statement of Sen.

The Past and Future Role of the Second Amendment and Gun Control 171
in Fights Over Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees
her unsympathetic response to the certiorari petition in the Sandidge
case,289 her work for the Clinton Administration,290 her characterization
of the NRA as a “bad guy” organization akin to the KKK,291 and even the
fact that “[s]he grew up on the upper west side of New York.”292 Indeed,
four of Kagan’s most determined opponents in the Senate presented a
47-minute colloquy devoted entirely to explaining how Kagan posed a
grave threat to Second Amendment rights.293
During the debate, Senators repeatedly condemned Kagan on
grounds that she was not asked to address when she testified before the
Judiciary Committee. For example, several senators emphasized that a
White House official, talking to newspaper reporters back in 1997, had
described the Clinton Administration’s effort to restrict imports of assault
weapons as a matter of “taking the law and bending it as far as we can to
capture a whole new class of guns.”294 The Senators used that provocative
quotation to suggest that Kagan wanted to ban guns and would distort
the law to achieve that end, even though they had not raised the issue
during Kagan’s hearing when she would have had a fair chance to explain
the Administration’s policy and the role she played in crafting it.
Several Senators also attacked Kagan because, as Solicitor General,
she did not file an amicus brief on behalf of the United States in the
McDonald case.295 Although no one asked Kagan about this during her

289
290
291
292
293

294

295

Shelby); id. at S6719 (statement of Sen. Coburn); id. at S6743 (statement of
Sen. Crapo); 156 Cong. Rec. S6759-6760 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010) (statement
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confirmation hearing, one Senator, Lindsay Graham, included it among
his supplemental questions submitted to Kagan in writing after the
hearing.296 Kagan had a rather compelling explanation. Decisions about
incorporation, such as McDonald, have no direct impact on the federal
government. They are really the business of state and local governments,
and therefore the federal Office of the Solicitor General had a longstanding
tradition of not taking a position on incorporation questions.297 Kagan’s
opponents in the Senate ignored that explanation. Indeed, they not
only insisted that Kagan’s failure to file a brief demonstrated her intense
hostility to Second Amendment rights, but also wrongly suggested that
Kagan was unwilling to explain the matter because a privilege shielded
her decisionmaking from scrutiny.298
The Senate confirmed Kagan by a vote of 63 to 37.299 Like
Sotomayor, Kagan won the support of nine Senators with “A” ratings
from the NRA.300 Some political pundits saw the result as a “significant
rejection” of the NRA’s lobbying and “a signal that Senate Democrats –
and a number of Republicans – are willing to buck the group that likes
to position itself as the thousand-pound gorilla of legislative lobbying
in Washington.”301 Others saw no reason to think the NRA had lost its
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clout and predicted that Senators would still “scurry like scared rabbits
the next time an NRA vote of consequence comes up.”302 The one thing
on which virtually all observers could agree is that the Senate continues to
grow ever more partisan and polarized in its handling of Supreme Court
confirmations.303
V. Conclusion
Guns are likely to remain a significant topic of discussion for future
nominations. Heller and McDonald were 5-4 decisions, after all, and so
when one of the majority’s five members leaves the Court, the scrutiny
of the nominated replacement’s attitudes toward guns will be particularly
intense. Moreover, even if, as I suspect, Heller and McDonald will never be
expressly overruled, their real effect remains to be determined. Although
the Supreme Court decided important questions about the scope of the
right to keep and bear arms, questions of even greater practical significance
remain unanswered. How strong is this right? Will it have virtually no
effect on gun laws other than in the few jurisdictions that have handgun
bans, or will it imperil a wider array of legal restrictions and controls
on guns? What level of scrutiny will courts use to determine what laws
infringe the right? The Supreme Court presumably will address these
questions at some point in the future, and its answers will determine the
real ultimate impact of what the Court did in Heller and McDonald.
Of course, nominees are unlikely to say how they will decide future
cases. Therefore, senators need to find ways to talk to nominees about
guns without directly asking how they would rule on the particular legal
issues that could come before the Court. Even when nominees try not to
reveal their views on unresolved questions, much can be gleaned from the
ways in which they describe the past cases or the ways in which they talk
about the questions likely to come up in the future. For example, during
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Politico.com, Aug. 5, 2010, available at LEXIS, Politico file; Ruth Marcus,
Broken Confirmation; The High Court Nomination Process Gets Worse, Wash.
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their respective confirmation hearings, Stephen Breyer and John Roberts
both gave stronger clues about their Second Amendment views than they
probably intended.304
Senators also might try asking about guns purely from a policy
perspective rather than as a constitutional issue. For example, senators
might ask a nominee whether, as a voter or legislator, she would support
various types of laws such as a ban on machine guns, a measure allowing
college students to carry concealed guns on campuses, or a provision
requiring all sellers at gun shows to conduct criminal background checks
on gun purchasers. Again, senators could take the constitutional aspect
of these issues off the table simply by asking the nominee to assume these
measures would be constitutional and to explain whether she would
support them as a policy matter. The answers might reveal a great deal
about the nominee’s overall perspective and inclinations toward gun
issues without directly calling for answers about future cases that could
come before the Court.
The confirmation process is far from perfect, but the face-to-face
dialogue between nominees and senators can promote more precise and
reasoned consideration of important issues. For both Samuel Alito and
Sonia Sotomayor, for example, the hearings performed that function and
provided some antidote to the strident and simplistic characterizations
being made about the nominee’s views outside the Senate’s hearing room.
A reasonable and thoughtful airing of differing views about guns at
Supreme Court confirmation hearings will not eliminate the bitterness
and stubbornness that pervades the debate over guns in America, but it is
at least a small step in the right direction.

304 See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.

